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REFLECTIONS ON THE FISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF A COMMON CURRENCY

Abstract

This paper studies the likely consequences of monetary unification among
the EC members for the conduct of fiscal policy in the EC countries (and by an
emerging Federal European Fiscal Authority).
following.

Among the conclusions are the

If the Eurofed is to be independent, the external exchange rate

policy of the EC should be assigned to the Eurofed and not to the fiscal
authorities.

Effective (as opposed to formal) independence of the Eurofed is

going to be very difficult to achieve.

Coordinated upper ceilings on national

public sector financial deficits are unnecessary and probably undesirable.
Coordination of national public expenditure policies, tax policies and
borrowing policies is in principle desirable for both efficiency and
distributional reasons.

The empirical models required for a serious welfare

analysis of fiscal policy coordination do not yet exist.
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REFLECTIONS ON THE FISCAL IIPLIC!TIONS OF! CODON CURRENCY
Villem H. Buiter and Kenneth M. Kletzer

1.

Introduction: Sense and Nonsense in the Delors Report.

The much increased likelihood of significant advances in European
monetary integration-and even of European monetary union in the medium-term
future-has not surprisingly shifted the spotlight on the need for
coordination of fiscal policies as a complement to monetary unification.

The

Delors Report [1989] made much of the fiscal implications of the movement
towards a greater degree of rigidity of nominal exchange rates among
participants in the exchange rate arrangements of the European Monetary System
(EMS).
A monetary union would require a single monetary policy and
responsibility for the formulation of this policy would consequently
have to be vested in one decision-making body. In the economic
field a wide range of decisions would remain the preserve of
national and regional authorities. However, given their potential
impact on the overall domestic and external economic situation of
the Community and their implications for the conduct of a common
monetary policy, such decisions would have to be placed within an
agreed macro-economic framework and be subject to binding procedures
and rules. This would permit the determination of an overall policy
stance for the Community as a whole, avoid unsustainable differences
between individual member countries in public sector borrowing
requirements and place binding constraints on the size and the
financing of budget deficits. (Delors Report [1989, p.18])

No deficits, please.

There are frequent further references in the Delors Report to the need to
control national public sector deficits and in a number of places the Report
becomes rather specific about the constraints to be imposed on national
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budgetary policy.

The passage quoted below (and similar ones scattered

through the Report) make this clear:
In the budgetary field, binding rules are required that would:
firstly, impose effective upper limits on budget deficits of
individual member countries of the Community, although in setting
these limits the situation of each member country might have to be
taken into consideration; secondly, exclude access to direct central
bank credit and other forms of monetary financing while, however,
permitting open market operations in government securities; thirdly,
limit recourse to external borrowing in non-Community currencies.
(Delors Report [1989, p. 24])
Space constraints do not permit an exhaustive analysis of this rather
unusual statement.

Note however, in the first proposed binding rule, the

startling asymmetry of the constraints on the public sector deficit: upper
limits but no lower limits.

Such an asymmetry can only be rationalized

through a belief that absent these constraints there would be a bias towards
government deficits that are too large rather than too small.

The reader of

the Report is provided neither with a criterion for measuring excess or
deficiency in public sector deficits nor with a hint of the evidence on which
the empirical judgement is based.

The statement appears to represents the

typical Pavlovian conditioned reflex of fiscally conservative central bankers
when faced with any and all government deficits.

An independent European Central Bank: form and substance.

The second proposed binding rule only makes sense if one believes that it
is possible that the new "independent" European System of Central Banks (ECB)
could still be forced (at any rate under extreme circumstances such at those
represented by a very high public debt overhang) into inflationary
monetization.

Such a situation could come about either because the ECB would

lack formal independence or because, despite formal independence, the ECB
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would choose to lose a game of chicken with the budgetary authorities rather
than causing a monetary and financial crisis by not giving in.

In what

follows the wisdom (or lack of it) of having an independent Central Bank will
not be considered.

There are good arguments both for and against it.

The

discussion is limited to the meaning of 'independence' and the means of
achieving it.
An effectively independent ECB is one which cannot be forced ,either by
law or by circumstances under the control of the budgetary authorities, (be
they member state governments or an emerging central fiscal authority) to
monetize deficits, to engage in open market operations or to engage in foreign
exchange market interventions (especially nonsterilized interventions).
Even if it were possible to identify any given change in the stock of
base money either as additional money issued "to finance the government
deficit", or as money issued as the counterpart of an open market purchase or
as money issued as the counterpart of a nonsterilized purchase of official
foreign exchange reserves, the distinction would be behaviourally meaningless
unless the different ways in which an additional ECU gets into the system
somehow convey different signals about the future actions of the monetary
authority.

In any case, monetary deficit financing, money injected through

open market purchases and money injected through nonsterilized purchases of
foreign exchange cannot be separately identified from the data.

The three

sources of base money growth are also operationally equivalent.
Consider e.g. the case of an accounting period during which the
government deficit excluding borrowing from the Central Bank is, say, ECU 100,
the monetary base and the Central Bank's holdings of public debt each increase
by ECU 100 and the stock of foreign reserves remains unchanged.

This could be

interpreted as representing ECU 100 of monetary financing of the government
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deficit with no net open market purchase of government debt by the Central
Bank and no unsterilized or sterilized foreign exchange market intervention.
Alternatively it could be interpreted as the outcome of zero monetary
financing of the deficit, ECU 100 of open market purchases of government debt
by the Central Bank and zero unsterilized and sterilized foreign exchange
market intervention.

A third possible interpretation is to view it as the

outcome of the following set of financial operations.
monetary financing of the deficit.

First, ECU -100 of

The Treasury is "overfunding" the deficit

by borrowing ECU 200 from the non-Central Bank public (ECU 100 more than the
government deficit) and thus increasing its balance with the Central Bank by
ECU 100. This corresponds to an ECU 100 reduction both in the monetary base
and in Central Bank holdings of government debt.

Second, ECU 300 of open

market purchases of public debt by the Central Bank (that is an ECU 300
increase in the monetary base and an equal increase in Central Bank holdings
of public debt).

Third, ECU 100 of sterilized purchases of foreign exchange

(that is an ECU 100 increase in foreign exchange reserves and an equal
reduction in Central Bank holdings of public debt) and fourth, ECU 100 of
nonsterilized sales of foreign exchange reserves (that is an ECU 100 reduction
in reserves matched by an equal reduction in the monetary base). There is no
natural benchmark or counterfactual. There are too many degrees of freedom.
If a Central Bank is formally independent but can easily be manoeuvred by
the fiscal authorities into a position where, given the Central Bank's own
objectives, the optimal thing to do is to create money to a much greater
extent than it would have chosen to do if the fiscal authorities could have
been induced to act differently, then Central Bank independence is an empty
shell.

Substantive independence presupposes a non-trivial domain over which

choice can be exerted.

Even if every inhabitant of Bangladesh were formally
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free to buy a Rolls Royce (which owing to import restrictions in that country
is actually unlikely to be the case) the budget constraints of most
Bangladeshis make this formal freedom an empty one.
One can easily imagine a formally independent Central Bank with a strong
(but not an absolute) aversion to inflation, confronting a fiscal authority
that is persistently unwilling (even though technically able) to cover current
outlays with current revenues.

Assume that, if the Bank does not provide

accommodating monetary growth and the Treasury does not reduce the deficit,
the public debt-GDP ratio will increase steadily.

If the debt were to grow

persistently faster than the rate of interest, eventual insolvency of the
Exchequer would result.

Even if there is no threat of insolvency, the

increasing debt burden would, if there is no "fist-order" debt neutrality, put
upward pressure on real interest rates and crowd out interest-sensitive
categories of private spending or increase the external current account
deficit.
Sargent [1986, pp. 19-39] contains an interesting description (attributed
by Sargent to Neil Vallace) of this game of "chicken" between a Central Bank
and a Treasury.

"Chicken" is a non-cooperative game in which both players

promise that they will adopt the strategy of Stackelberg leaders.

For each of

the players, of course, the announced strategy is feasible only if the other
player acts as a follower.

This struggle for dominance between the monetary

and fiscal authorities represents a situation of Stackelberg warfare (Sargent
[1986, p. 37]). To complicate matters, in the USA the game is between the
Central Bank and a rather more Balkanized set of fiscal authorities, i.e. it
is a three- or more sided game of chicken.
The Central Bank asserts that, come hell or high water, it will not
engage in inflationary monetization, in the hope of forcing the fiscal
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authorities to take steps to reduce the deficit.

A unified fiscal authority

counters by asserting that it will under no circumstances reduce its deficit,
hoping to convince the Central Bank to monetize the deficit in order to
prevent a steep rise in real interest rates, financial distress etc.
Alternatively, with a Balkanized fiscal authority, the Central Bank may
(mixing metaphors) suffer the fall-out from an unresolved game of chicken
between two or more fiscal warlords.

The Vhite House fiscal warlord may

threaten to veto any tax increase ("read my lips") in the hope of forcing one
or more of the Capitol Hill fiscal warlords to accept spending cuts.

Blocking

coalitions of Capitol Hill warlords may veto cuts in certain spending
categories ("not in my constituency") in the hope either of directing the
spending axe elsewhere or of securing a tax increase.
Unpleasant things tend to happen when an irresistible force meets an
immovable object.

Vhile no one likes to be caught bluffing, the resolve of

the Central Bank may well weaken as its sees the debt burden rising.

If it

believes the fiscal authority is unlikely to mend its ways, it may rationally
opt to be chicken rather than risking a head-on collision. The dilemma is
resolved through monetization and inflation.
In a recent paper Ben Friedman [1990] has argued that in the years to
come the rising corporate debt burden in the USA may play the role attributed
to public debt in the Sargent-Vallace scenario:

tough anti-inflationa ry

monetary policy is not credible given the financial exposure and fragility of
the US corporate sector.

In the British context Buiter and Miller [1983] have

identified a similar game of chicken during the 1970's between the trades
unions on the one hand and the monetary and fiscal authorities on the other
hand (in Britain the Central Bank is formally and effectively subordinate to
the Treasury).

Unions submitted inflationary wage demands (and often

7

succeeded in imposing inflationary wage settlements) in the expectation that
demand management would be accommodating.

No government would be willing to

live with the unemployment consequences of non-accommodating monetary and
fiscal policy.

Governments talked tough about not validating inflationary

wage and price developments.

During most of the seventies it was the

governments that blinked and lost the game.

The new Conservative

administration that came to power in 1979 changed the rules of the game (at
any rate during its early years) and broke the inflationary momentum with the
deepest recession since the 1930's.
One way to increase the likelihood that the Central Bank will win the
game of chicken with the fiscal authorities is by convincing the latter that
the Central Bank is implacably, irrevocably and unalterably opposed to any and
all inflation.

This could be achieved by the founding fathers and mothers of

the Central Bank appointing someone (or a group of people) to head the Central
Bank who is known to possess extreme, perhaps even irrational or pathological,
inflation aversion.

(The appointment procedure for the first and subsequent

heads of the Central Bank will of course be crucial for this to work).

It

isn't wise for anyone to play a game of chicken with an adversary who may be
slightly insane.

Believing it is dealing with an anti-inflationary fanatic of

doubtful rationality, the Treasury may prefer to give in rather than to test
the resolve of the Central Bank. The possible rationality of choosing an
agent who does not exactly share one's objectives (or who may even be
irrational) is explained very clearly in Schelling [1960]
The use of thugs and sadists for the collection of extortion or the
guarding of prisoners, or the conspicuous delegation of authority to
a military commander of known motivation, exemplifies a common means
of making credible a response pattern that the original source of
decision might have been thought to shrink from or to find
profitless, once the threat had failed. (Just as it would be
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rational for a rational player to destroy his own rationality in
certain game situations, either to deter a threat that might be made
against him and that would be premised on his rationality or to make
credible a threat that he could not otherwise commit himself to, it
may also be rational for a player to select irrational partners or
agents.) (Schelling [1960], pp. 142-143)
This idea has recently been taken up again, amongst others by Rogoff [1985b].
Vhile formal independence of the ECB is not sufficient to rule out the
possibility of the ECB being forced into accommodating inflationary
monetization, it is a necessary condition.

It is important to stress that

formal independence requires that the ECB have control over all sources of
money creation: monetization of public sector deficits, monetization through
open market purchases and monetization though (non-sterilized) purchases of
foreign exchange.

If, say, foreign exchange market intervention were to

continue to occur at the initiative of the national Treasuries (or the central
European Community (EC) fiscal authority) and if the ECB were not to be free
to engage in sterilizing sales or purchases of public debt, there would not
even be a formally independent monetary authority. Vb.at this means in
practice is that for the Central Bank to be independent, the exchange rate of
the ECU with non-EC currencies must be under the control of the Central Bank,
and not of the national or supranational fiscal authorities.
In principle it is of course possible for the Central Bank to have
control over all sources of money creation and yet for the Treasury to have
control over the exchange rate.

This would be the case if fiscal instruments

could be used to influence the various arguments in the money demand function.
Even with perfect capital mobility between the EC and the rest of the world,
international interest taxes or subsidies could enforce departures from
uncovered interest parity.

Since the EC is large in the world economy, fiscal

policy could be used to influence the world level of real interest rates and
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(given the stance of monetary policy) also the level of nominal interest
rates, which is one of the arguments in the money demand function.

If nominal

interest rates affect EC money demand differently than money demand in the
rest of the world, this would be a further channel through which the exchange
rate could be influenced through fiscal policy.

In addition, various spending

and tax instruments could be used to influence the "scale variables" in the
money demand function such as income or (financial) wealth.

Given the rather

severe limitations in practice on the flexible use of fiscal instruments and
their uncertain effects on money demand and on the exchange rate, at least the
day-to-day management of the exchange rate would have to be the province of
monetary policy.
The post-Delors Report consensus that is emerging in and around Brussels
appears, fortunately, to have been purged of the Report's rather obsessive
concern with upper limits on national public sector budget deficits.

However,

there also appears to be agreement that the determination of the common EC
external exchange rate should not be the exclusive province of the "Eurofed",
but should be determined by the appropriate political budgetary authority (or
authorities) in the new Community.

Ve sympathize with the view that the

exchange rate is too serious a matter to be left to the Central Bank.

The

unavoidable implication of that view is, however, that the Central Bank cannot
be independent.
The authors of the Report may well be right in their lack of confidence
(implicit in the (now apparently discarded) budgetary recommendations of the
Report) in the independence of the proposed ECB. The recent embarrassing (to
Central Bank pride) subjugation of the Bundesbank by Chancellor Kohl in
connection with the latter's 'out of the blue' proposal for instant monetary
union between the FRG and the GDR makes it clear that in the last resort even
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the most independent Central Bank will give in to the political authorities.
It is however, somewhat ironic to find side by side in the Delors Report a
statement about the need to create an independent ECB and an implicit
admission that there are identifiable contingencies when independence is bound
to be an empty phrase.
As regards the last of the triad of proposed binding rules, it is very
hard to make sense of the curious concern with the currency composition of
external borrowing.

If a European national fiscal authority or an emerging

Federal European fiscal authority can borrow externally in US Dollars,
Japanese Yen or inconvertible Rubles, why shouldn't it? \lb.ere is the
externality?

2.

Exchange rate unification, monetary unification and fiscal coordination.

If phases 2 and 3 of the Delors Report's scheme for exchange rate
unification and monetary union are eventually implemented, a single European
Central Bank and a single European currency will emerge. The long-standing
opposition to this scheme by British Prime Minister Thatcher (and the less
vocal but probably no less determined opposition of the Bundesbank and part of
the current West German political leadership) make it unlikely, however, that
full exchange rate and monetary union for the European Community are imminent.
The recent preoccupation of the West German authorities with the monetary,
financial and fiscal consequences of their take-over of the bankrupt East
German economy is likely to create further delays in the implementation of the
Delors monetary agenda.
How robust is the proposition that exchange rate unification and monetary
union create greater need for fiscal policy coordination than would prevail
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under greater exchange rate flexibility?
With a high degree of international capital mobility and a fixed nominal
exchange rate (and a fortiori with a full single-currency, monetary union with
pooled international reserves), individual national fiscal authorities will
lose control over national seigniorage as a means of financing national public
sector deficits.

The total amount of seigniorage that can be extracted by the

fixed exchange rate zone or the monetary union as a whole and its distribution
among the members of the union (and between the member governments and a
strengthened and enlarged central authority in Brussels) remain objects of
choice and potential bones of contention.
In the case of the European Community, the currencies of two of the
intended members of the monetary union (The D-Mark and the Pound Sterling)
have been used and continue to be used both as official international reserves
and as components of private working balances by agents outside the proposed
monetary union.

The ECU, when it emerges as a full-fledged currency can be

expected to play a similar international reserve and vehicle currency role.
Ve can therefore anticipate bargaining over the distribution of both the
external and the internal seigniorage.
Changes in the degree of national control over seigniorage revenue will
have implications for the rest of the budget, if only because government
solvency constraints must be met.

The concept of solvency used by

macroeconomists and public finance specialists only makes sense in a
dynamically efficient economy.

In a non-stochastic world, dynamic efficiency

rules out the possibility that the rate of interest be forever below the
growth rate of real economic activity.

In a dynamically efficient economy, a

solvent government is assumed not to be able to play Ponzi games with its
debt: the value of the outstanding national debt can be no_greater than the
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sum of the present discounted value of anticipated primary (non-interest)
public sector financial surpluses and the present discounted value of
anticipated future issues of high powered money1 .
There are large differences in primary surpluses (as a proportion of GDP)
between the members of the European Community. For the ten countries listed
in Table 1 the general government primary surplus as a percentage of GDP/GNP
in 1988 ranges from +4.6 percent for Denmark to -6.3 percent for Greece. For
the nine countries for which net public debt-GDP ratios are given in Table 1,
the range in 1988 is from 21.2 percent for Denmark to 123.7 percent for
Belgium. There is no systematic tendency over the past decade for primary
surplus-GDP ratios to be positively correlated with debt-GDP ratios.

The

arithmetic consequence is a very wide range of public sector financial
balance-GDP ratios, from +0.8 percent for the U.K. to -14.5 percent for Greece
in 1988.
Recourse to seigniorage has been relatively small in most European
Community member states (see Table 2).

Exceptions to this rule are Italy

(before 1986) and Portugal, Greece and Spain.
Monetary policy can be an important policy instrument even if the use of
base money as a source of seigniorage is negligible.

If the right kind of

nominal stickiness or inertia in wages or prices is present in an economic
system with imperfect international capital mobility, real economic activity
can be influenced both by the systematic and the unanticipated components of
the monetary rule.

Vith a fixed exchange rate and perfect international

capital mobility national monetary stabilization policy has national effects
only to the extent that it influences the world rate of interest.

With a

monetary union national monetary policy exists only through national influence
on the decisions of the union's Central Bank.
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3.

National Solvency .Vithout National Monetary Policy.

The public sector budget identity for any country

1

can be written as

follows:

.
di= (ri - ni)di - ~i - ui
Here dis the debt-GDP ratio, r the instantaneous real interest rate on
the non-monetary public debt, n the growth rate of real GDP,
surplus-GDP ratio and

u

~

the primary

seigniorage as a proportion of GDP (the ratio of

changes in the stock of base money to nominal GDP).
Vith the abolition of all remaining capital controls within the European
Community, full covered interest parity can be expected to prevail among the
member states.

Vith complete and credible exchange rate unification,

uncovered nominal interest rate parity will also be established among the
members.

Vhether or not this leads to greater convergence of real interest

rates is a question that is theoretically and empirically open.
;nci+'!ln+~Tnon,,ci

..L.LLJ..JUUJ.&.LUu,.i. VVU.~

Vith complete

n,,-r~'haci;nrr
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.PU..LV.LL

implies real interest equalization.

The behaviour of national producer and

consumer price indices is far from being well characterized by PPP.

Mean

reverting tendencies appear to be weak or even absent for a number of key real
exchange rate indices, so even as a long-run characterization of the data, PPP
leaves a lot to be desired.
It is true that real exchange rate volatility and uncertainty have been
statistically associated very strongly with nominal exchange rate volatility
and uncertainty.

If this statistical association survives the Lucas critique

when a further move towards reduced nominal exchange rate flexibility occurs,
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there will be a reduction in those components of national real interest
differentials that reflect nominal exchange risk premia.

No such presumption

exists for the contribution to national real interest differentials due to
anticipations of real exchange rate appreciation or depreciation.

For the

sake of argument, however, consider the case in which following nominal
exchange rate unification, national real interest differentials on the public
debt vanish, except of course for differentials due to market perceptions of
differences in national public debt default risk premia.
Vith similar primary surpluses ~i , similar seigniorage ui and similar
real interest rates ri, countries with high current debt-GDP ratios di will
have more rapidly rising debt-GDP ratios unless higher GDP growth rates ni
come to the rescue of the high debt countries.

There is little evidence to

support the view that high debt countries are high growth countries
(see Table 1).
The pure version of the solvency constraint does not rule out the
possibility that a forever rising (and eventually unbounded) public debt-GDP
ratio is consistent with solvency.

As long as the growth rate of the debt-GDP

ratio is less than ri- ni (which in a dynamically efficient economy will
eventually or in the long run be some nonnegative number), d can rise without
bound with the government's solvency intact.
This surprising fiscal feat is possible because the government is assumed
to have access to lump sum taxes which, without distortions or enforcement
costs, enable it to appropriate (and to use for debt service) any amount of
resources less than or equal to the sum of GDP and the interest on its debt.
Allowing for distortionary taxation and/or for tax compliance costs is
sufficient to establish a finite upper bound for the public debt-GDP ratio.
Vhile these bounds need not be the same for all countries, it is likely that
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the current high debt countries will encounter their barriers before the less
indebted countries.

Countries like the U.K. may already be in the position

that a continuation of current primary deficits and seigniorage patterns
implies a steadily declining debt-GDP ratio.
With a currency union (or even just a credible fixed exchange rate
system) a country headed for insolvency no longer has the option of
unilaterally determining the extent to which it uses the inflation tax.
Neither seigniorage narrowly defined (high-powered money creation), nor the
rest of the "anticipated inflation tax" (the effects of anticipated inflation
on the primary deficit through fiscal drag or through the Tanzi effect and the
Tobin effect of expected inflation on the real interest rate), nor the
"unanticipated inflation tax" on holders of long-dated nominally denominated
government debt are national policy instruments any longer.

It also seems

unlikely that any single member country will have enough influence on the
Community's Central Bank to allow it to assign the community-wide inflation
rate to the solution of its national fiscal problems.

That leaves cuts in its

primary public sector deficit and/or default on its debt as the only two
policy options.

The perception by the market of the existence of default risk

will, by adding a default risk premium to the interest rate on the public ·
debt, exacerbate the fiscal problem and bring forward the moment when actual
default becomes inevitable.
All this is likely to be painful for the inhabitants (and the government)
of the heavily indebted country.

The question is, should it be of concern to

the other members of the Community? Are there efficiency or equity arguments
for constraining the member states' public sector financial deficits, primary
deficits or even spending and revenue-raising separately, that is is there a
case for coordinating budgetary policy among the member states?
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4.

National Public Sector Deficits and Community-wide Interest Rates:

Pecuniary vs. Technological Externalities.

The arguments frequently made in favor of international coordination of
fiscal policies, both in the scholarly literature and in nontechnical policy
debate, appear to apply with equal force regardless of the exchange rate
regime.

They often rely on fiscal externalities or spillovers that are

present whenever domestic and foreign government debts are traded
internationally or indeed when any form of international transmission is
present.

A representative example of this kind of argument in a contribution

to the policy debate can be found in the following quote from Professor
Casella's response to an editorial opinion in The Economist which had stated
that there was "no economic reason why the members of a common monetary system
should not run budget deficits as they see fit." Referring to a common
monetary system she writes:
Suppose first, in accordance with standard economic theory, that
national governments with tax-raising powers could be considered
safe borrowers (in contrast to private corporations). National
debts in a common currency would be perfect substitutes and would
therefore earn a common interest rate. A spending spree by one
member state (Italy?) could be accommodated with a small increase in
the interest rate-given the absence of exchange rate risk-but it
would be an increase in the interest rate on the debt of all member
states. In other words, the value of government bonds everywhere
would fall, and the capital losses in the foreign portfolios would
indirectly help to support the Italian deficit. Of course, the
possibility of exporting the cost of financing government
expenditure would distort incentives in the conduct of economic
policy, in general leading to excessive deficits in all countries.
Some form of coordination would be required. (Casella [1989] p. 4)
Even when (small) spreads between national borrowing rates (reflecting
differential risks of de jure or de facto repudiation) are possible, the story
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just told could still hold.

Quoting again,

In a world with few borrowers, it may still be possible for one
state to influence the value of the other states' debt if rates move
in the same direction. (Casella [1989] p. 4)
Frenkel, Goldstein and Masson [1988] in their survey of international coordination o
economic policies state ( emphasis added)
. . . that economic policy actions, particularly those of larger
countries, create quantitatively significant spillover effects or
externalities for other countries, and that a global optimum
requires that such externalities be taken into account in the
decision-making calculus. Coordination is then best seen as a
facilitating mechanism for internalizing these externalities.
(p. 3)
They go on to stress the noncompetitive behavior of larger countries who
"exercise a certain degree of influence over prices including the real
exchange rate" (p. 3).
No doubt the authors of these quotes are, like other professional
economists, fully aware of the distinction between efficiency-based and
distribution-based arguments for policy intervention (including international
policy coordination) and know the conditions under which international
spillovers can have important efficiency or distributional consequences.

In

policy-oriented economic writing aimed at a wider audience it is especially
important to be clear and explicit (albeit non-technical) about the economic
reasoning underlying key assertions and propositions.

The subject of

spillovers, international transmission and interdependence involves subtleties
that make it mandatory to cover all bases when addressing the intelligent lay
person.
Since the late 19th century economists have recognized what are now
called "technological externalities" as possible reasons for market failure
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and as possible grounds for government intervention in the market mechanism.
As Laffont [1987] states succinctly, a
. . . technological externality [is], the indirect effect of a
consumption activity or a production activity on the consumption set
of a consumer, the utility function of a consumer or the production
function of a producer. By indirect, we mean that the effect
concerns an agent other than the one exerting this economic activity
and that this effect does not work through the price system.
(p. 263)
Such technological externalities (positive or negative) will upset the
first fundamental theorem of welfare economics and create a prima facie case
for intervention.
During the 1920s and 1930s another kind of externalities or external
economies labeled "pecuniary external economies" by Viner [1931] was the
subject of much confused debate. The classic article "Two Concepts of
External Economies" by Scitovsky [1954] settled many of the central issues
(see also Bohm [1987]).
Pecuniary externalities work through the price system and refer to the
effects of producer or consumer activities on the input or output prices of
other producers, consumers or suppliers of factor services.

It should be

clear that when all the assumptions required for competitive equilibria to be
Pareto optimal are satisfied, pecuniary externalities have no efficiency
implications. They are merely another word for general market
interdependence. When a consumer, alone or together with many other
consumers, shifts his consumption bundle towards bananas and the price of
bananas increases as a result, all those who were "long" in bananas (i.e. the
net banana exporters) will benefit, and all those who were "short" in bananas
(the net banana importers) will suffer a welfare loss. There may be important
distributional issues involved, but there is no efficiency or market failure
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argument for intervention.
At its simplest, the example developed by Professor Casella can be
interpreted as describing an "international pecuniary externality".

Unless

there are other departures from competitive efficiency, the higher foreign
interest rate that results from increased domestic borrowing need not involve
any inefficiency.

There are interesting distributional issues (international

and intergenerational) which we have analyzed in a number of papers (Buiter
and Kletzer [1990a,b]).
Much {though by no means all) of the work on international policy
coordination uses national objective functions or social welfare functions
that are not easily rationalized as utilitarian aggregators of underlying
individual preferences.

That need not pose any problems if one is interested

in a positive theory of policy design.

The objectives pursued by those

actually in command of the instruments of economic policy may reflect narrow
sectional or group interests rather than the utilitarian ideals of the
philosopher kings that motivate many of the normative approaches to policy
design.

Even for many of the positive or descriptive approaches to economic

policy design it remains true, however, that it is not easy to rationalize the
policy makers' objectives in terms of the self-interest of any group, however
broad or narrow.
Vhen a utilitarian national objective function is optimized, it is
important for a full appreciation of the meaning of statements such as
,"cooperation increases (or reduces) national social welfare", to go behind
the national (or global) social welfare functions and to verify what happens
to the welfare of the individual consumers or households.
In Buiter and Kletzer [1990b] we show that, in a two-country overlapping
generations 2 world with perfect international capital mobility, policy
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cooperation is not required to achieve equilibria that are Pareto efficient in
terms of the underlying private preferences. Vith only non-distortionary
lump-sum taxes and transfers (and with government borrowing only constrained
by the requirement that solvency be maintained), cooperation is required to
achieve Pareto optima with respect to the two national social welfare
functions.

Cooperation and international transfers (or side payments) are

required to achieve optimality with respect to a global social welfare
function that can be seen as a utilitarian aggregator of the two national
social welfare functions.

In this case, the gains in national or global

social welfare are purely distributional: some lose and some gain.

A national

social welfare function represents a specific weighting of the welfare of
(successive generations of) a nation's residents.

The global social welfare

function represents a further specific weighting of the welfare of the
residents of the two nations.

Cooperation does not achieve a Pareto

improvement with respect to the underlying individual preferences.
Vhen distortionary taxes or subsidies are added to the instrument
arsenal, it can easily happen that the achievement of a Pareto optimum with
respect to the two national social welfare functions (or the achievement of an
optimum for the global social welfare function) requires the use of the
distortionary instruments.

This will certainly be the case if there is no

mechanism for effecting lump-sum international redistribution.

For example,

investment taxes and subsidies can be used to influence the distribution of
income between the two countries' fixed factors (labor in Buiter and Kletzer
[1990b]).

In that example national social welfare Pareto optima and global

social welfare optima will not be Pareto optima with respect to the underlying
individual preferences.

The cooperative pursuit of national social welfare

here means that some efficiency is sacrificed in order to achieve preferred
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distributional outcomes.
There obviously is nothing wrong with knowingly trading off efficiency
for equity.

It is, however, not always obvious that this is what is being

done when national social welfare functions are plonked down and optimized.
It is also not hard to think of other examples in which cooperation can lead
to efficiency gains as well as improved distribution or, in the spirit of
Rogoff [1985a] and Kehoe [1986], to efficiency losses and worse distribution.
the moral of all this is that it is wise to stand back and reflect a bit when
confronted with a finding that cooperation does (or does not) improve social
welfare.

Careless use of a national social welfare function for optimal

policy design in an otherwise sensible model of the economy may create the
misleading impression that one is dealing with a representative agent model,
the nadir of macroeconomic analysis.

Redistribution and conflict are swept

under the carpet and what may well be the major obstacles to cooperative
international policy design are ignored.
Returning to the problem of international interest rate spillovers, it is
indeed likely that in a financially integrated Europe, borrowing by any
government (or private agent) will put upward pressure on interest rates
everywhere.

If a government borrows to the point that its ability to service

the debt becomes questionable, a default risk premium will be added to its
borrowing costs and it may face credit rationing.

Neither a community-wide

increase in interest rates nor the market's response to a perception of
sovereign risk need create an efficiency based argument for intervention or
for coordination aimed at preventing these contingencies.
Higher interest rates will have international distributional consequences
that are a legitimate concern of policy makers.
redistribute income from borrowers to lenders.

Higher interest rates
This is true within national
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economies and between national economies. Vithin a national economy higher
interest rates redistribute income towards rentiers and away from labour and
the owners of other real resources.

It also tends to be associated with

intergenerational redistribution from the young to the old.

In the

international context, the major resource transfer from debtor countries to
creditor countries following the sharp increase in real interest rates in the
early eighties is a dramatic example of the redistributive implications of
interest rate changes.
Sovereign default risk affecting one of the member states may create
externalities for the other member states that may be pecuniary or
technological in nature.

Asymmetric information and/or limited rationality

may give rise to bandwagon or contagion effects that may cause default risk
premia and credit rationing to spread to member countries for whom the
fundamentals do not warrant such penalties.
no means certain.

Such occurrences are, however, by

In the private sector we observe the coexistence of firms

with very different credit ratings and conditions of access to credit markets.
Default and bankruptcy of one firm, or even of a number of firms, need not
results in panics and market seizures.
Some of the concerns expressed about the high debt countries in the
Community seem to be born from the fear that the Community as a whole will be
compelled (or feel compelled) to socialize part or all of their debt.

Vhile

one cannot rule out categorically this or any other unusual future policy
action by the new Community, there seems to be no compelling economic or
political logic to support it.

Even within existing nation states, provincial

and local governments don't act as if they assume that the higher government
tiers will routinely assume their liabilities. Vhen city governments go into
(the public sector equivalent of) receivership, as New York City did in the
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Seventies, the costs in terms of financial and economic disarray, loss of
autonomy etc. appear to be sufficiently high to discourage emulation and
repeat performances.
Ve can therefore safely assume that even with a common European currency
and unrestricted capital mobility, the Italian public debt will remain the
Italian public debt, to be serviced out of Italian primary surpluses and out
of whatever amount of seigniorage Italy manages to get from the ECB.
International intra-Community transfers may well grow in significance as the
Community matures.

Among the criteria governing such transfers the relative

magnitudes of the various national debts can be expected to play at most a
very minor role.

The total (private and public) international indebtedness of

a country will, as one of the components of the wealth of the nation, play a
role in future games of distribution, but the national debt per se can be
expected to remain a national responsibility.
Summarizing, international interdependence and international spillovers
do not by themselves imply market failure and do not create an automatic
efficiency case for any form of intervention including international policy
coordination.

Interdependence or spillovers reflecting the transmission of

policy through competitive markets and prices (be they commodity prices or
asset prices and rates of return) do not create an efficiency-based case for
policy coordination unless there are other distortions or sources of market
failure in the economy.

This is true even if the policy authorities are

"large" and deliberately try to influence market prices in the pursuit of
national advantage.
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5.

Non-Valrasian Equilibria, Pecuniary and Technological Externalities.

l&en the economy has "preexisting" distortions or when the instruments
the government manipulates in the pursuit of national advantage create
inefficiencies or distortions, an efficiency-based case for coordination may
exist.

Among the preexisting distortions that may make policy transmission

through market prices inefficient are:

distortionary taxes; technological

consumption or production externalities; noncompetitive behavior; incomplete
markets; and Keynesian market failure reflecting insufficient or excessive
effective demand.
Even when markets are competitive, policy-induced distortions are absent
and conventional technological consumption and production externalities are
absent, a role for policy coordination may exist.

As pointed out by Laffont

[1987], when we move away from competitive equilibria in which all the
assumptions for Pareto optimality are satisfied, market prices may do more
than equate supply and demand and distribute income:
In economies with incomplete contingent markets, prices span the
subspace in which consumption plans can be chosen. In economies
with asymmetric information, prices transmit information. l&en
agents affect prices, they affect the welfare of the other agents by
altering their feasible consumption sets or their information
structures. (p. 264)
In such economies the distinction between pecuniary and technological
externalities vanishes because changes in prices do more than create or
destroy rents. 3 It is quite possible that the arguments in favor of the
'coordinated international management of international pecuniary fiscal
externalities are (implicitly) based on such a non-Valrasian world view.

It

is of course always desirable to bring out explicitly either the reason(s) for
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the breakdown of the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics or the
distributional criteria that support the cooperative fiscal policy
prescription.
Vith monetary policy emasculated as an instrument of national economic
policy, the large differences between the debt burdens of Community member
states foreshadow significant differences in the paths of future primary
surpluses. Vhile current and future primary surpluses are a very imperfect
measure of the impact of fiscal policy on aggregate demand, there is a
presumption that countries saddled with the need for relatively large future
primary surpluses will have a relatively contractionary stance of fiscal
policy.
If demand-deficient Keynesian equilibria are likely to result from
contractionary fiscal policy actions, a prima facie case for policy
intervention, including international coordination of policies, exists.

In a

Keynesian unemployment equilibrium the value of output foregone exceeds the
value of the extra leisure "enjoyed" by the unemployed.
closed economy.

This holds even in a

In addition, in an open economy, part of any demand

contraction (fiscal or private) will spill over to the rest of the world
through the deflating country's demand for imports and supply of exports.
This will create a non-pecuniary externality to the extent that goods and
labor are not priced properly.

If nominal wage stickiness (or the combination

of nominal wage stickiness and price stickiness) is the key link in the
transmission mechanism that causes demand-deficient equilibria to result from
a contraction of demand, the magnitude of the international spillover will
actually be smaller (given perfect international capital mobility) with any
credible fixed exchange rate regime than with a floating exchange rate regime.
The payoff from international coordination is correspondingly reduced.
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It goes without saying that the efficient use of policy instruments such
as exhaustive national public spending with international technological
externalities will in general require international policy coordination (see
e.g. Kehoe [1986,1987]).

Public expenditure for the abatement of pollution of

rivers, oceans and the air is one example.

Defense expenditures and

expenditures on law enforcement (given the increasingly transnational nature
of major criminal activities) are another.

The same holds for the efficient

use of distortionary taxes and transfers, even when the activities that are
taxed or subsidized do not have direct international technological
externalities. 'When there are such international externalities (think of the
taxation or regulation of national activities producing acid rain, ozone holes
or greenhouse effects) the case for international coordination of taxation,
subsidization and regulation is of course reinforced.

6.

Conclusion.

This paper studies only a few among the very large number of important
fiscal policy issues facing the members of the European Community as they move
along the road towards further economic and political integration.

The new

Europe will be characterized by greater (and increasing) mobility of factors
of production, of owners of factors of production ,of beneficiaries of
transfer payments and of consumers of local, regional, national and
Community-wide public goods.

Interesting issues arise when the domain of

mobility of rational private agents and the span of fiscal control or the size
of the regulatory jurisdictions do not coincide.

Issues like tax

harmonization and tax competition (see e.g. Giovannini [1988], Giovannini and
Hines [1990], Razin and Sadka [1989], Sinn [1990a], become central issues in
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addition to (or even rather than) concerns about the stabilization function of
national fiscal policy. The application of destination vs. origin principles
of commodity taxation and residence vs. source principles of (capital) income
taxation will have major effects on competitiveness and the location of
economic activity (Dixit [1985], Slemrod [1988], Krugman and Feldstein [1989],
Sinn [1990b]).

Internal transfer pricing by multinational corporations poses

formidable challenges to the ability of national governments to tax
multinationals' profits. The theory and practice of fiscal federalism will be
required reading for European public finance scholars.

Suitably modified

versions of the theory of local public goods and of the theory of clubs will
have to guide the design of efficient and fair tax and public expenditure
systems and in the new Europe.
For distributional reasons and, given the myriad departures from the
competitive Valrasian and Tieboutian ideal types, for efficiency reasons also,
coordination of national fiscal policies will be desirable in the new Europe
(as it was in the old). There is no good argument why such coordination
should give high priority (or indeed any priority) to binding agreements on
public sector budget deficits.

It is wellknown that the public sector deficit

(level, change or share of GDP, "raw", structural, operational, full
employment, demand-weighted, inflation-corrected, permanentized or otherwise
transformed or transmogrified), is not an adequate measure of the impact of
fiscal policy on aggregate demand or on aggregate supply (short-run or
long-run), nor an index of financial crowding out pressure.

In Buiter and

Kletzer [1990a] we also show that any real effects of public sector deficits
can be reproduced with a balanced budget and flexible taxes and transfers.

It

is very hard to come up with any reasonable argument for giving this statistic
the attention it gets (See also Blinder and Solow [1974], Buiter [1983, 1985]
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and Kotlikoff [1988]).
There is no royal road to fiscal policy coordination.

Agreements on

contingent rules for the various tax, spending and financing instruments will
have to be struck in the face not only of uncertainty about the exogenous
environment, but also of "model uncertainty", i.e. uncertainty about the
effects of policy instruments and exogenous events on key endogenous economic
variables.

Policy cooperation can at least ensure that strategic uncertainty

doesn't complicate the task of economic management even more.
The desire for maximal scope to respond flexibly to new contingencies
will have to be balanced against the need for simplicity and transparency in
the cooperative policy rules.

The success of any common strategy depends on

its credibility with the private sector inside and outside the Community.
Unless the private sector knows and understands the policy rules and is
capable of monitoring and verifying the adherence of the various governments
to the cooperative strategy, credibility will be wanting and the strategy will
fail.
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NOTES
1For this solvency constraint
to be a non-trivial constraint, the public
debt should be valued gross of any discount reflecting a perceived risk of
default, and the interest rates used to discount future primary surpluses and
seigniorage should be net of any default risk premium. 'When the market value
of the debt is variable (and potentially different from its issue value, par
value or redemption value) even without the presence of any default risk (as
is for instance likely to be the case with long-dated debt), the calculation
of what the value of the public would be in the absence of default risk is a
non-trivial matter.
2Examples of the use
of the two-period OLG model in two-country models
are Buiter [1981], Buiter and Eaton [1983], Kehoe [1986a], Hamada [1986] and
Sibert [1988]. The Yaari-Blanchard OLG model has been applied to two-country
models in Frenkel and Razin [1987], Obstfeld [1989] and Buiter [1989].
3van Huyck [1989] eliminates
the central auctioneer and price-taking
behavior from the Valrasian model.

In the resulting model of "decentralized

competition," pecuniary externalities have efficiency consequences.

I

J
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